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ARTICLES
FAITH AND FUNDING: TOWARD AN
EXPRESSIVIST MODEL OF THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
DAVID COLE*
Few issues are more divisive in American legal culture than
government support of religion. Concern about official financing of
religion dates back at least to James Madison's celebrated resistance to a
proposed Virginia tax to subsidize the salaries and building costs of
churches, a central precursor to the First Amendment's Religion Clauses.1
For more than fifty years, government aid to parochial schools has been the
single most recurrent issue in the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause
jurisprudence. Today's debate over vouchers redeemable at parochial
schools is only the latest manifestation of this long-running public dispute.
Yet we are no closer to an acceptable resolution of how far the government
may go in supporting religion today than we have ever been. The debate
divides sharply between separationists, who are suspicious of virtually any
aid to religion, and assimilationists, who argue that religious institutions
should receive the same support that secular institutions do, even if that
means raising tax dollars to subsidize the salaries and building costs of
churches.
* Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. I would like to thank Steve Goldberg, Abner
Greene, Ron Hopson, Ira Lupu, Naomi Mezey, Steve Shiffrin, and Mark Tushnet for their thoughtful
comments. I also benefited from presenting these ideas at faculty workshops at Comell Law School
and the Georgetown University Law Center, and at forums on faith-based initiatives sponsored by the
Open Society Institute, St. John's University, Harvard University, and the Jacob Bums Ethics Center at
Benjamin Cardozo School of Law. Matthew Kilby, Dan Derechin, and Ellis Johnston provided
excellent research assistance.
1. JAMES MADISON, Memorial & Remonstrance, in 2 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183
(G. Hunt ed., 1901), reprinted in Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 63-74 (1947).
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The debate has been rekindled recently by President George W.
Bush's initiative to expand federal funding to faith-based social service
agencies, and by several recent bills that have enacted into law the concept
of "charitable choice."2 Church-state separationists and civil libertarians
have warned that the faith-based initiative would forge a dangerous liaison
fraught with difficulties for the state, for religion, and for nonbelievers
alike. 3 Proponents of the initiative have argued that it is simply designed to
level the playing field by allowing religious entities to compete on an equal
footing with secular providers for government funds.4
The faith-based initiative poses a novel question in the world of faith
and funding: May the government aid religious entities where it does so
precisely because of the religious character of their activities? Government
support of religious entities is nothing new. Religious groups such as
Catholic Charities already receive well over half their revenue from
government sources, but under strict requirements that the money be used
only for secular activities.5 Churches and synagogues receive substantial
tax subsidies, as well as valuable general services such as fire and police
protection, both of which have the effect of subsidizing core religious
activity, but on equal terms with secular nonprofits. Strict separation of
church and state is neither possible nor just in the modern era, where the
state provides support to all sectors of society in one manner or another.
2. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13199, 66 Fed. Reg. 8499 (Jan. 29, 2001). See also 42 U.S.C.
§ 604a (Supp. III 1997) (setting forth a framework to permit "[s]tates to contract with religious
organizations ... on the same basis as any other nongovernmental provider").
3. See generally Steve Benen, Leap of Faith, CHURCH & STATE, Mar. 2001, at 4, 5 (quoting the
Reverend Barry W. Lynn, executive director of Americans United for the Separation of Church and
State, as saying "Bush's plan is the single greatest assault on church-state separation in modem
American history"); Stuart Taylor Jr., The Risk Is Not Establishing Religion, but Degrading It, 33
NAT'L J. 320, 320-21 (2001) (fearing that the faith-based initiative could lead to divisive competition
for funding and government regulation of religious programs); Mei-Ling Hopgood, Bush Faith-Based
Initiative Troubling, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Apr. 8, 2001, at 1 (reporting that gay rights advocates are
concerned that faith-based funding will perpetuate hiring discrimination against gays).
4. See 66 Fed. Reg. 8499 (Jan. 29, 2001) (emphasizing need for all groups to compete on a
"level playing field"). See also Leslie Lenkowsky, Commentary, Funding the Faithful: Why Bush Is
Right (WCBS radio broadcast, June 1, 2001). Cf STEPHEN V. MONSMA, WHEN SACRED AND SECULAR
Mix: RELIGIOUS NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS AND PUBLIC MONEY (1996) (advocating broader
government support of religiously based nonprofits as a way of achieving "positive neutrality" toward
all religious and secular groups); Carl H. Esbeck, Equal Treatment: Its Constitutional Status, in EQUAL
TREATMENT OF RELIGION IN A PLURALIST SOCIETY 9 (Stephen V. Monsma & J. Christopher Soper eds.,
1998) (hereinafter EQUAL TREATMENT) (arguing that "equal treatment" of religion requires broader
support of religious nonprofits where secular nonprofits receive government support).
5. In 1993, government sources provided 65% of Catholic Charities' income, 75% of the Jewish
Board of Family and Children's Services' income, and 92% of Lutheran Social Ministries' income. See
MONSMA, supra note 4, at 1.
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What is groundbreaking about the faith-based funding initiative, then,
is not that it seeks to support religious entities, but that it seeks to do so
because they are religious entities. The initiative is premised in significant
part on the conviction that because of their faith, religious providers are
better than their secular counterparts at delivering certain social services.6
President Bush credits his own recovery from alcoholism to finding faith in
God.7 Teen Challenge, a fundamentalist Christian drug addiction treatment
program championed as a leading example of successful faith-based social
services, insists that there is no recovery without finding Jesus.8 While the
provision of generally available support to religious entities on neutral
terms and for wholly secular activities is relatively noncontroversial, the
notion that government can support religion because of its religious
character would appear to mark a radical departure from Establishment
Clause jurisprudence.
The dispute over funding faith-based social services reflects a deeper
divide in American culture, between those who believe that religion already
plays too dominant a role in public life,9 and those who believe that
religion has been improperly banished from the public square.'0 Like so
many difficult public policy issues, this issue tends to polarize the public,
legal scholars, and judges. To separationists, virtually any state subsidy of
religious activity offends the Establishment Clause. To assimilationists,
virtually all aid to religious activity is permissible, so long as the funding
serves a secular purpose and is distributed pursuant to criteria that treat
religious and secular recipients equally.
11
6. See, e.g., Lenkowski, supra note 4 (observing the ubiquity of religious organizations that
provide services to the needy and noting that there is evidence that such programs are particularly
attractive to certain groups of recipients of social services); Joe Klein, In God They Trust, NEW
YORKER, June 16, 1997, at 40, 42, 44 (reporting on views of those who support faith-based services).
7. Benjamin Soskis, Act of Faith: What Religion Cannot Do, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 26, 2001, at
20,23.
8. CHARLES L. GLENN, THE AMBIGUOUS EMBRACE: GOVERNMENT AND FAITH-BASED
SCHOOLS AND SOCIAL AGENCIES 62 (Robert P. George ed., 2000)..
9. See, e.g., Rogers M. Smith, "Equal" Treatment? A Liberal Separationist View, in EQUAL
TREATMENT, supra note 4, at 179; Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religious Participation in Public Programs:
Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195, 204-06 (1992); Ellen Willis, Freedom from
Religion: What's at Stake in Faith-Based Politics, NATION, Feb. 19, 2001, at 11, 11-16.
10. See generally STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW AND
POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 3 (1993); Esbeck, supra note 4, at 12.
11. I borrow the term "assimilationist" from Kathleen M. Sullivan, Parades, Public Squares and
Voucher Payments: Problems of Government Neutrality, 28 CONN. L. REV. 243, 244-45 (1996).
Assimilationists themselves prefer to characterize their position as advocating neutrality. See, e.g.,
MONSMA, supra note 4, at 173-97. That term, however, is also claimed by separationists, who
maintain that a strict wall between church and state is the only way to remain neutral. As Steven D.
Smith has pointed out, virtually everyone in the debate claims the mantle of "neutrality," but that
2002]
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This divide is reflected on today's Supreme Court. Four justices-
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas-take a
strict assimilationist view, approving of any aid to religion so long as it is
administered in a formally neutral manner,12 while three Justices-Souter,
Ginsburg and Stevens-adopt a separationist stance, viewing most direct
government support of religious activity as unconstitutional.13 Only
Justices O'Connor and Breyer (and sometimes only O'Connor) have staked
out the middle ground, where government support to religion pursuant to a
neutral law of general applicability is sometimes but not invariably
permissible.14
This Article seeks to provide an alternative to the polarization that so
often characterizes debates about church and state. In Part I, I will suggest
that there are good policy reasons for supporting faith-based initiatives, and
that these reasons ought to be attractive to liberals and progressives, many
of whom have opposed faith-based initiatives. Faith-based social services
are, after all, social services, and are often the very types of welfare
services that liberals and progressives tend to support. Core religious
values-in particular, concern about the less fortunate, a belief in human
dignity, and a commitment to the possibility of redemption-reinforce
liberal values that appear to have lost ground in modern America.
Religious institutions are an integral element of a vital civic society and
have an independent normative authority that may permit them to succeed
where secular institutions have not. The case for supporting faith-based
services does not require proof that faith-based services are better for all; it
only requires that they may be better for some. That seems likely, even
though solid empirical evidence is not yet available.
Several important caveats should be noted. The faith-based initiative
may simply be a cover for privatizing public services, and for reducing
public support for the most needy. Faith-based institutions and their
proponents often attribute problems of poverty to personal moral failings,
concept by itself is incapable of generating substantive principles to guide the doctrine. Steven D.
Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the "No
Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 313-16, 325-31 (1987). Because cultural meaning will be
critical to the establishment analysis I propose herein, I seek to avoid rhetorically favoring either the
separationists or the assimilationists with the label of "neutrality."
12. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
13. See, e.g., Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 867-68 (Souter, J., dissenting); Rosenberger v. Rector
& Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 863 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting).
14. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 838-39 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See also Good News Club v.
Milford Cent. Sch., 121 S. Ct. 2093, 2111 (2001) (Breyer, J., concurring). In Rosenberger, where
Justice Breyer sided with the separationists, Justice O'Connor was the lone voice in the middle.
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 863-99.
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minimizing the systemic and structural features of those problems.
Religious institutions can be a fount of intolerance and prejudice toward
nonbelievers generally and women and gays and lesbians in particular.
And government support of religious institutions may itself undermine and
dilute the effectiveness of religious institutions. Thus, the faith-based
initiative is not without significant dangers. But its potential benefits
nonetheless provide strong reasons for supporting the concept in principle.
In Part II, I will argue that the current constitutional polarization on
public aid to religion is also unwarranted. Both the assimilationist and the
separationist camps paint with too broad'a brush. I suggest an expressivist
approach to the Establishment Clause, built upon Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor's endorsement test, as a mediating principle. The endorsement
test asks whether a reasonable observer would interpret challenged
government conduct as approving or disapproving religion. It provides that
the government must avoid messages that make adherence to religion
relevant to political standing in the community. While initially developed
to assess government messages and displays, the endorsement test need not
be limited to those confines, and in particular provides a critical tool for
assessing the constitutionality of government funding. This is because
once one acknowledges that some government support of religion is
permissible under, and indeed required by, the Constitution, it is not
enough to ask whether. the government has aided religion. Nor is it
sufficient to ask whether the government has been formally neutral, as the
assimilationists do. The endorsement test focuses not on the mere fact of
funding, but on what the funding expresses. Funding schemes should be
invalidated only where they express official approval or disapproval of
religion, and thereby send the message that religious adherence is relevant
to citizens' standing vis-A-vis their government. The expressivist approach
proposed here avoids formalism, pays attention to effects, and takes
cognizance of the special status of religion.
The expressivist approach recognizes that, as Kenneth Karst and Ira
Lupu have observed, Establishment Clause concerns are more sharply
raised in the United States today by official religious messages than by
government funding of religion.15 Government benefits can and in most
settings must be distributed neutrally, without favoring particular religions
or religion over nonreligion. Official religious. messages, by contrast, are
15. KENNETH L. KARST, LAW'S PROMISE, LAW'S EXPRESSION: VISIONS OF POWER IN THE
POLITICS OF RACE, GENDER, AND RELIGION 148-49 (1993); Ira C. Lupu, Government Messages and
Government Money: Santa Fe, Mitchell v. Helms, and the Arc of the Establishment Clause, 42 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 771, 773 (2001).
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not susceptible to neutrality, and therefore pose more immediate
constitutional concerns. For this reason, it is relatively noncontroversial
that school prayer, a form of government religious message, is
unconstitutional, while the constitutionality of vouchers remains a hotly
debated question. In my view, however, the line between government
funding and government message is not a sharp one; the structure and
distribution of a government funding program may itself express an
impermissible government message regarding religion. And some
government funding programs themselves constitute government speech.
The expressivist approach seeks to distinguish permissible from
impermissible aid by identifying when government funding becomes
government speech.
While the endorsement test asks the right question by attempting to
identify the message that government conduct expresses, it has been justly
criticized as vague and indeterminate. 16 Part III accordingly proposes three
lines of inquiry that provide structure to the endorsement inquiry when
government aid to religion is at issue. The first asks whether a government
funding program constitutes government speech, an inquiry already
undertaken in free speech jurisprudence. When the government hires a
speaker to express the government's own message, the speaker is engaged
in government speech. As a matter of free speech doctrine, such programs
need not satisfy the general First Amendment obligation of content and
viewpoint neutrality; the government may dictate what can and cannot be
said. Precisely because the government exercises content control in those
settings, however, any incorporation of religious content into the program
should be strictly forbidden.
The second inquiry, applicable to all non-government-speech
programs, examines whether the structure of the funding program
impermissibly endorses religion. When the government funds social
services without dictating the content of speech, it usually can, and in some
cases must, support both religious and nonreligious activity. In these
settings, government support of religion is generally permissible as long as
the government program as a whole has a secular purpose, applies neutral
criteria in selecting funding recipients, and ensures that adequate secular
alternatives are available for all who seek to receive government-supported
services in a secular setting. Such programs do not send a message that
adherence to religion is relevant to political standing, and therefore should
16. See, e.g., William P. Marshall, "We Know It When We See It": The Supreme Court and
Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495, 533-37 (1986); Smith, supra note 11, at 276-301; Mark
Tushnet, The Constitution of Religion, 18 CONN. L. REV. 701, 711 (1986).
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be permissible even if they result in direct government funding of religious
activity.
The third line of inquiry under the expressivist model distinguishes
between direct and indirect support of religious practices. Contemporary
Establishment Clause jurisprudence draws a sharp line between direct
government aid, which generally may not support religious activity, and
indirect aid routed through private individual choice, such as vouchers,
which may generally support religious activity without creating a
constitutional problem unless the private routing is a transparent fiction.
17
Some have criticized the distinction as formalistic because whether
government funds are put to religious uses directly or indirectly they are
still supporting religious activity. The expressivist model insists that there
is something to the distinction, however, because the two different types of
aid often express very different messages about religion. When aid goes to
private individuals without any directive as to where it can be spent, any
support provided to religious activity will be the result of private rather
than public initiative. A neutral program of aid to individuals expresses
neither approval nor disapproval of religion; it simply leaves that choice to
the private sphere. The direct-indirect distinction, however, has important
limits, because government must often approve or disapprove of the
institutions and practices to which private individuals can direct their
government resources, and if that prior decision sends a message approving
or disapproving religion, it will contravene the Establishment Clause.
The expressivist approach leads to decidedly mixed results for faith-
based initiatives. On the one hand, it suggests that even direct government
support of religious activity is sometimes permissible. Where the direct aid
is part of a non-government-speech program that treats religious and
secular entities equally while guaranteeing secular alternatives, the aid
should often be acceptable, because it would not express an impermissible
government message vis-a-vis religion. On this view, provisions in
existing "charitable choice" statutes barring any use of direct government
funds for religious proselytizing or indoctrination are constitutionally
unnecessary. 8 On the other hand, when the government is supporting the
expression of an official government viewpoint, all government aid to
religious activity should be strictly forbidden, even when the aid is
neutrally available to secular and religious entities and is channeled
through individuals. Government speech may not be religious.
17. E.g., Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Serv. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481,487 n.4 (1986).
18. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 604a(j) (Supp. 11 1997) (barring expenditure of federal funds "for
sectarian worship, instruction, or proselytization").
2002]
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This approach suggests that government support of religious drug
treatment and rehabilitation programs generally should be forbidden,
whereas government support of faith-based soup kitchens and sports
leagues should be permitted. It disqualifies a substantial set of faith-based
social services from government support, those that constitute government
speech programs, but permits even direct aid to religious activity in settings
that do not involve government speech. Both separationists and
assimilationists will likely be dissatisfied with my approach, but I consider
that a strength rather than a weakness. In this area, absolutes are
rhetorically tempting but ultimately unsatisfactory.
The policy and constitutional sections of this Article are admittedly in
some tension. The former proffers reasons for supporting faith-based
initiatives, while the latter raises a potentially serious constitutional barrier
to a significant subset of faith-based programs, specifically those properly
understood as government speech. That tension may be inescapable, and
reflects the necessarily ambivalent relation between democracy and
religion in modem American society. The expressivist model proposed
here acknowledges that tension, and seeks to provide a useful guide
through the Scylla of separation and the Charybdis of assimilation.
I. THE CASE FOR SUPPORTING FAITH-BASED SOCIAL SERVICES
Liberals and progressives have been quick to criticize government
funding of religious social services. Their opposition is not surprising,
given liberals' longstanding insistence on a wall between church and state
and condemnation of public aid to parochial schools. Thus, the ACLU and
Americans United for Separation of Church and State have predictably
opposed the faith-based initiative. In a reaction common to the left, Ellen
Willis in The Nation characterized Bush's faith-based initiative as "a bold
assault on the separation of church and state." 19
But there are many good reasons why liberals and progressives ought
to look favorably on government funding of faith-based social services.
First, they are social services. If providing social services through faith-
based institutions makes social welfare services more politically acceptable
across the board, liberals ought not reject it out of hand. Faith-based social
services hold the potential for uniting conservatives and liberals on social
welfare and crime policy. Many conservatives approve of religious
interventions because they see crime and poverty as rooted in lapsed moral
19. Willis, supra note 9, at 11. See also supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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values, and consider religion to have been unfairly driven from the public
domain.20 Liberals are generally more inclined to emphasize the material
and socioeconomic causes of crime and poverty, and to be suspicious of
organized religion. But the types of social interventions in which religious
entities tend to engage-provision of food and shelter, rehabilitation,
community-building activities, and social reintegration-are precisely the
kinds of responses to social problems that liberals have long preferred.
21
American society has increasingly responded to social problems by
investing in the criminal justice system rather than addressing them
proactively. At the same time that we have "reformed" welfare and
watched the gap between rich and poor grow, we have invested in an
unprecedented expansion of police, prosecutors, and prisons. We have
been far less eager to provide needed social support, such as job training,
economic development, and quality education. 22 Whatever else one might
say about them, religious institutions do not have the authority to
incarcerate. They intervene proactively, by sponsoring organized youth
activities, fostering mentoring programs, and offering community-
strengthening activities (such as church choirs, sports leagues, etc.). They
provide basic assistance (such as food and shelter) and counseling to those
in need. And they intervene at the rehabilitation stage, offering guidance,
halfway housing, or drug treatment. All of these measures should be
preferable, from a liberal standpoint, to our nation's current reliance on
incarceration as a response to social disintegration.
Second, religious institutions are often well situated to provide
necessary social services in poverty-stricken areas. Criminologists
assessing community-based interventions designed to decrease criminal
behavior have found, for example, that institutions based in the community
are more effective than outside institutions, that broad-based organizations
are better than institutions narrowly focused on crime, and that
20. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BENNETT, JOHN J. DIIULIO, JR. & JOHN P. WALTERS, BODY COUNT:
MORAL POVERTY... AND HOW TO WIN AMERICA'S WAR AGAINST CRIME AND DRUGS (1996); PETER
L. BERGER & RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, To EMPOWER PEOPLE: FROM STATE TO CIVIL SOCIETY
(Michael Novak ed., 1996); MARVIN OLASKY, RENEWING AMERICAN COMPASSION 24 (1996) ("No
bureaucracy, and no amount of money, can buy the reformation of morals that is desperately needed.");
Carl H. Esbeck, A Constitutional Case for Governmental Cooperation with Faith-Based Social Service
Providers, 46 EMORY L.J. 1 (1997).
21. See, e.g., ELLIOTr CURRIE, CONFRONTING CRIME: AN AMERICAN CHALLENGE (1985)
(arguing that crime will be reduced most effectively by providing work opportunities, promoting
income equality, and investing in child care).
22. See id. at 140-41; David Cole, The Paradox of Race and Crime: A Comment on Randall
Kennedy's "Politics of Distinction," 83 GEO. L.J. 2547, 2567-70 (1995).
20021
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organizations that reinforce community ties are especially effective. 23 An
organization need not be religious to meet these criteria, of course, but in
many inner city neighborhoods, religious institutions are the only viable
entities that do.24  As Glenn Loury has observed, "reports of successful
efforts at reconstruction in ghetto communities invariably reveal a religious
institution, or set of devout believers, at the center of the effort." 25
The story of the Ten Point Coalition in Boston, Massachusetts is
illustrative.26  In May 1992, a shootout and multiple stabbing during a
funeral service in Boston's Morning Star Baptist Church sparked a group of
African-American clergy to form the Ten Point Coalition. 27 Although
some of the clergy had been harsh critics of policing strategies in Boston,
they began to work together with the police to respond to gang violence. 28
They engaged in street ministry, walking the streets of Boston's most
troubled neighborhoods, where they reached out to troubled youth and
helped them get their lives in order.29 They helped the police identify the
few youth who were responsible for the most violence, and advocated
harsh measures against them, while simultaneously urging leniency on
behalf of many others.3" Boston's homicide rate plummeted, falling 80%
from 1990 to 1999, 3" and the police and scholars have both acknowledged
the critical role of the Ten Point Coalition in that success story. 32
23. DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM 206-07 (1999).
24. Id. See generally Jenny Berrien, Omar McRoberts & Christopher Winship, Religion and the
Boston Miracle: The Effect of Black Ministry on Youth Violence, in WHO WILL PROVIDE?: THE
CHANGING ROLE OF RELIGION IN AMERICAN SOCIAL WELFARE 266, 266-84 (Mary Jo Bane et. al. eds.,
2000); John J. Dilulio, Jr., Godly People in the Public Square, PUB. INTEREST, Oct. 1, 2000, at 110.
25. Glenn C. Loury, Professors and the Poor: Discussion at a Poverty Conference, in ONE BY
ONE FROM THE INSIDE OUT: ESSAYS AND REVIEWS ON RACE AND RESPONSIBILITY IN AMERICA 210,
213 (1995).
26. See Berrien et al., supra note 24, at 266.
27. Id. at 272-73.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 278-79.
31. Id. at 266.
32. Id. at 274-80. In an interview on National Public Radio about Boston's crime prevention
strategy, police commissioner Paul Evans stated, "The secret to our success has been the city's success.
When we talk about a comprehensive approach, we're working with nonprofits, community-based
groups; [and] the clergy in the area of prevention .... We're more apt now to go out and say, 'let's get
the street workers, let's get the clergy, let's get some non-profits."' Talk of the Nation (National Public
Radio broadcast, July 14, 1999). See also Klein, supra note 6, at 41 (quoting William J. Bratton, former
Boston police commissioner, saying "You couldn't function effectively without the ministers in
Boston .... Those churches, and [religious] leaders like Gene Rivers, were a very significant reason for
our success."). But see Anthony Braga, David M. Kennedy, Anne M. Piehl & Elm J. Warms, The
Boston Gun Project: Impact Evaluation Findings 14-15 (May 17, 2000) (research report submitted to
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Third, religious values and commitments may facilitate the effective
provision of social services. As a general matter, religions share basic
tenets that can be critical to helping the disadvantaged and rehabilitating
and reintegrating people who have violated community norms and
expectations. At their best, religious communities are committed to the
equal dignity of all human beings,33 to the importance of community and
the need to think beyond oneself,34 and to the notion that all human beings
make mistakes but deserve forgiveness and can be redeemed. Each of
these commitments is critically important in the fight against poverty and
crime. None of these commitments is exclusively religious, and all of them
have a place in secular society, but they arguably play a more central role
in religious settings. In addition, moral teaching is more comfortably
situated in religion than in many government or secular settings.
36
Government support of faith-based institutions offers the possibility of
reinforcing these values throughout society.
Consider rehabilitation. Secular society has largely given up on the
notion. We invest little in rehabilitating criminals in prison, or in seeking
to reintegrate them into the community upon their release. It has not
always been so. As late as 1968, 72% of Americans believed that
rehabilitation should be prison's primary purpose. 37  But today
the U.S. Natl. Inst. of Just.), at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/urbanpoverty/sitepage/UrbanSeminar/
Violence/Papers/BragaBGP%20report.pdf (attributing the sharp decline in Boston youth homicides in
1996-97, a 63% decrease in monthly youth homicides, to Operation Ceasefire, a Boston Police
Department initiative, and asserting that the Ten Point Coalition did not directly contribute to the
decline).
33. The right to be treated with equal dignity and respect is recognized in Christianity. ROBERT
TRAER, FAITH IN HUMAN RIGHTS 88-89 (1991). It is also recognized in Judaism, id. at 101-03, Islam,
id. at 112-19; and Buddhism, id. at 134-37.
34. Themes of the importance of community and charity are found in Judaism, Lenn E.
Goodman, The Individual and the Community in the Normative Traditions of Judaism, in RELIGIOUS
DIVERSITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 18-19 (Irene Bloom et al. eds., 1996), Islam and Christianity, KEITH
WARD, RELIGION AND COMMUNITY 31-52 (Islam), 131-210 (Christianity) (2000); THE ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF RELIGION 224 (1987) (regarding "charity"), Hinduism, Joseph W. Elder, Hindu Perspectives on the
Individual and the Collectivity, in RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra at 70-84, and
Buddhism, Robert A. F. Thurman, Human Rights and Human Responsibilities: Buddhist Views on
Individualism and Altruism, in RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra at 86, 96.
35. The themes of rehabilitation and redemption are found in Christianity, John Langan, The
Individual and the Collectivity in Christianity, in RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra
note 34, at 159-63, Judaism, ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA 4-76 (1972) (on "teshuvah"), and Islam,
SINCERE REPENTANCE 9 (Abu Maryam Majdi Fathi AI-Syed comp., Molana Mohammed Amin
Kholwadia trans., 1995) (discussing Islamic concept of repentance for wrongdoing).
36. See NANCY L. ROSENBLUM, MEMBERSHIP AND MORALS: THE PERSONAL USES OF
PLURALISM IN AMERICA 74 (1998) (noting that religious associations are "universally viewed as
depositories of moral values and scenes of moral education").
37. MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE 44 (1999).
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rehabilitation is largely absent from our criminal justice policy, which
instead emphasizes deterrence, incapacitation, and retribution. 8  As a
result, over the last twenty-five years the prison population in America has
skyrocketed. From 1925 to 1975, the per capita incarceration rate remained
virtually constant, at about 110 incarcerated persons per 100,000.9 In the
last twenty-five years, however, the rate has quadrupled."n We now lead
the world in per capita incarceration, and our incarceration rate is five times
higher than that of any other Western nation.41 Without a belief in the
possibility of rehabilitation, there is little to stop the imposition of longer
and longer sentences on more and more people.
Religious interventions might help restore a societal commitment to
rehabilitation. The concepts of forgiveness, mercy, and redemption are at
the core of many faiths.42 When secular society abandoned rehabilitation
programs in the nation's prisons, the job was left to religious organizations,
like the Catholic Church, Charles Colson's Prison Fellowship, and the
Nation of Islam. Anecdotal evidence indicates that these interventions can
work.43 But there are not nearly enough of them to meet the need. One
consequence of the boom in incarceration over the last 25 years is a
correlative boom in convicted felons returning to society for the
foreseeable future. In 2001, approximately 600,000 inmates returned to the
community, or 1600 per day. 44 Unless we support rehabilitation and
reintegration for these inmates when they reenter society, we can expect
more crime. 45  Faith-based organizations are uniquely situated both to
provide prisoners and ex-convicts those services, and to remind all of us of
the importance of rehabilitation and reintegration to a vibrant and caring
community.
38. Id. at 71-78. But see Fox Butterfield, Inmate Rehabilitation Returns As Prison Goal, N.Y.
TIMES, May 20, 2001, at 1 (noting that rehabilitation has long been discredited and largely abandoned,
but suggesting that it is returning as a value in some state criminal justice systems).
39. MAUER, supra note 37, at 17, 83.
40. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 502
(1998).
41. MAUER, supra note 37, at 23; David Cole, As Freedom Advances: The Paradox of Severity in
American Criminal Justice, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 455, 457 (2001).
42. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
43. See, e.g., Jon Loconte, The Bully and the Pulpit, POL'Y REV., Nov. 1, 1998, at 28 (describing
the success of Teen Turnaround, a faith-based juvenile rehabilitation program in Dallas, and the Ten
Point Coalition's Fatherhood Program, which seeks to rehabilitate abusive and criminal parents).
44. Butterfield, supra note 38; Jeremy Travis, But They All Come Back: Rethinking Prisoner
Reentry, in SENTENCING & CORRECTIONS, No. 7, at 1, 1 (Nat'l Inst. of Justice, U.S. Dep't of Justice
May 2000) (projecting from then-current trends that over 500,000 inmates would leave prison in 2000).
45. See generally Travis, supra note 44.
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The religious commitment to charitable work may also contribute to
the effectiveness of faith-based programs. 46 Through volunteers, religious
entities may be able to achieve more for each dollar spent. And the notion
that work for others is a central part of one's religious identity may
contribute to the spirit in which the work is done; employees of religious
entities may be less likely than employees of secular organizations and
government agencies to treat their work as just a job. While this factor is
difficult to measure, common sense suggests that those who are more
committed to their work will be more productive.
Fourth, religion offers a source of normative authority and community
identification independent from the state. As Michael McConnell has
argued, the "essence of 'religion' is that it acknowledges a normative
authority independent of the judgment of the individual or of the society as
a whole. 47 This independent normative authority may be critical to the
role religion plays in many social services. Criminologists have found, for
example, that people who commit crimes are more likely to be
independent, to lack community ties, and to view the state as illegitimate.
The pervasive distrust that many poor and minority members of our society
feel towards the criminal justice system may therefore contribute to the
increased criminal behavior found in those communities.48
Interventions that have the potential to restore legitimacy and build
community are therefore critically needed. A religious community,
because it has an independent locus of authority and a community not
defined by the state, may be able to reach out to those who have rejected
the authority of the state. Jenny Berrien, Omar McRoberts, and
Christopher Winship, studying the Ten Point Coalition in Boston,
concluded that the coalition did just that, affording an "umbrella of
legitimacy to the police, an otherwise suspect force in the inner city." They
further argue:
If one were looking for legitimacy through a relationship, there could
perhaps be no better partner than a group of ministers. Throughout
society ministers have unique moral standing. It is assumed that they are
fair and that they will protect the interests of the less fortunate. In the
inner city, ministers and their churches are among the last formal
46. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
47. Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115,
172-73 (1992). Stephen Carter has similarly argued: "Religions are in effect independent centers of
power, with bona fide claims on the allegiance of their members, claims that exist alongside, are not
identical to, and will sometimes trump the claims to obedience that the state makes." CARTER, supra
note 10, at 35.
48. COLE, supra note 23, at 169-78.
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institutions committed to the welfare of their neighborhoods. Within the
black community, they often have been looked to for leadership.
49
Legitimacy without justice is necessarily fleeting, so unless the
underlying problems of inequality are addressed, true and lasting
legitimacy will not be attained. But as the Boston experience shows,
religious institutions can be of significant assistance in a transition to a
more just and effective order.
In addition to legitimacy, a religious organization may be able to offer
important community support otherwise missing from a person's life.
Alcoholics Anonymous, for example, a particularly successful faith-based
treatment program, is emphatically independent, radically decentralized,
religious (although nondenominational), and committed to community.
Group members commit to support one another in their efforts to fight
alcoholism. The twelve-step program requires participants to look beyond
themselves to a "higher power" in order to be cured, and strongly
encourages regular participation in meetings. A secular or governmental
institution might well be able to incorporate similar obligations without a
commitment to a "higher power," but the independent, religious character
of the group provides an important bond.5°
The Nation of Islam's success in reforming felons in and out of
prisons is a more controversial example. Its authority is self-consciously
separate and distinct from that of the state and mainstream white culture,
and it may well derive much of its power from that separate status.
Founded in the 1930s by a Detroit door-to-door rug and silk salesman
named Wallace Fard Muhammad, the Nation of Islam works extensively in
prisons and the inner city, and most of its members are young black men,
including many former addicts and criminals. 51 James Baldwin observed:
Elijah Muhammad [then-leader of the Nation of Islam] has been able to
do what generations of welfare workers ... have failed to do: to heal and
redeem drunkards and junkies, to convert people who have come out of
prison, and to keep them out, and to make men chaste and women
virtuous, and to invest [them] with a pride and a serenity that hang about
them like an unfailing light.52
49. Berrien et al., supra note 24, at 279.
50. On the role of faith and community support in Alcoholics Anonymous, see ALCOHOLICS
ANONYMOUS WORLD SERVICES, INC., TWELVE STEPS AND TWELVE TRADITIONS (1953); MILTON A.
MAXWELL, THE ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS EXPERIENCE: A CLOSE-UP VIEW FOR PROFESSIONALS
(1984); Henry L. Hudson, How and Why Alcoholics Anonymous Works for Blacks, in TREATMENT OF
BLACK ALCOHOLICS II (Frances Larry Brisbane & Maxine Womble eds., 1985).
51. C. ERIC LINCOLN, THE BLACK MUSLIMS IN AMERICA 22-24 (3d ed. 1994).
52. JAMES BALDWIN, THE FIRE NEXT TIME 72 (1963).
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While hard data are not available, the Nation of Islam continues to
enjoy a reputation for successfully rehabilitating many criminals.53 The
Nation provides a strong support network in and out of the prisons,
enforces a strict religious code, and inculcates group solidarity and
responsibility for oneself and others: members "are expected to live soberly
and with dignity, to work hard, to devote themselves to their families'
welfare, and to deal honestly with all others." 54  Central to the Nation's
solidarity and community, however, is its commitment to racial separatism.
Members are taught that "[t]heir social tragedies are caused by the white
devil's tricknology, but truth and hard work will soon make them free. 55
Thus, in this case religion's independent normative authority is decidedly
double-edged.
Finally, religious social services are an important feature of a vital
civil society. Many have argued that religion is an important mediating
institution that teaches people how to be citizens, by providing a
community defined by concern for others, and by affording people space to
develop and to express normative judgments that may differ from those of
the mainstream. Alexis de Tocqueville considered religion particularly
important to republican government because "[e]very religion also imposes
on each man some obligations toward mankind, to be performed in
common with the rest of mankind, and so draws him away, from time to
time, from thinking about himself. ' 56  George Washington agreed,
contending in his Farewell Address that "[o]f all the dispositions and habits
which lead to political prosperity, [r]eligion and morality are indispensable
supports. 57 Religion, in other words, is a training ground for citizenship,
and particularly for the care and concern for others so central to social
cohesion.
53. See id. at 109-10; Andrea Ford & Russell Chandler, A Growing Force and Presence, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 25, 1990, at Al ("Community activists in Los Angeles and other major cities have voiced
their belief that the Nation of Islam has proven many times that its doctrine can help turn around young
men whose lives otherwise appear headed for self-destruction."); Amy Kaslow, Nation of Islam Extends
Its Reach Behind Prison Walls, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 20, 1996, at 9 ("Data are not available,
but the organization's zero-tolerance policy for criminality has earned it a reputation for being an
effective reformer."). Cf James Brooke, Million Man March Inspires Action in Denver
Neighborhoods; Message Finds Fertile Ground Across U.S., DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 31 ,1996,
at 4A (noting effect of Million Man March, organized by Nation of Islam, on involvement in
neighborhood watch groups and other anticrime initiatives).
54. LINCOLN, supra note 51, at 78.
55. ld. at 110.
56. 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 444-45 (J.P. Mayer ed., 1969).
57. GEORGE WASHINGTON, Farewell Address 1796, in WRITINGS 962, 971 (John Rhodehamel
ed., 1997). See also Tushnet, supra note 16, at 735-36 (discussing civic republicans' view that religion
was an important locus for inculcating public-regarding virtues).
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Modern scholars have lamented the demise of associational activity in
American society, including a drop in religious involvement, and have
argued that we need to revive civil society.58 If religion is a central
mediating institution in civil society, it may provide benefits to the
democracy as a whole that warrant its support, or at least argue against
excluding religious institutions from equal eligibility for support otherwise
available to similarly situated secular organizations.
In sum, there is reason to believe that at least for some individuals and
some communities, faith-based social interventions may offer benefits that
secular interventions cannot. To justify supporting faith-based services,
one need not conclude that they are uniformly more effective than secular
alternatives, but only that they may be more effective in some contexts and
for some people. And although empirical evidence of the effectiveness of
faith-based programs is thin,59 the results of the few studies that have been
conducted are promising. Studies of Catholic schools have found that all
other things being equal, disadvantaged students fare better there than in
public schools.60 A National Institute for Healthcare Research study found
that inmates in New York prisons who attended at least ten Bible studies
classes a year were three times more likely to stay out of trouble after
release. 61  A 1995 review of criminology literature found that religious
influences discourage crime and delinquency.62  Harvard economist
Richard Freeman found in 1985 that children involved in churches were
more likely to escape poverty, crime, drugs, and joblessness. 63 Teen
Challenge, a Christian drug treatment program, has reportedly been found
58. See, e.g., BERGER & NEUHAUS, supra note 20; ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE
COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000); Stephen Macedo, Constituting Civil
Society: School Vouchers, Religious Nonprofit Organizations, and Liberal Public Values, 75
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 417 (2000).
59. See Soskis, supra note 7, at 20 (arguing that there is little sound empirical support for the
proposition that faith-based social services are more effective than secular services, and that there is
"not enough research into faith-based programs to arrive at any but the most preliminary conclusions"
about their effectiveness).
60. GLENN, supra note 8, at 35; MONSMA, supra note 4, at 166-67.
61. Byron R. Johnson, David B. Larson & Timothy C. Pitts, Religious Programs, Institutional
Adjustment, and Recidivism Among Former Inmates in Prison Fellowship Programs, 14 JUST. Q. 145,
161 (1997).
62. T. David Evans, Francis T. Cullen, R. Gregory Dunaway & Velmer S. Burton, Jr., Religion
and Crime Reexamined: The Impact of Religion, Secular Controls, and Social Ecology on Adult
Criminality, 33 CRIMINOLOGY 195, 208-09 (1995).
63. Richard B. Freeman, Who Escapes? The Relation of Church-Going and Other Background
Factors to the Socio-Economic Performance of Black Male Youths from Inner-City Poverty Tracts
(June 1985) (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 1656), available at
http://papers.nber.org/papers/wl656.pdf. See also Robert Worth, Amazing Grace: Can Churches Save
the Inner City?, WASH. MONTHLY, Jan. 11, 1998, at 28.
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to have a 95% success rate with heroin addicts, and an 83% success rate
with alcoholics, far exceeding that of most secular drug and alcohol
treatment programs. 64  And the longstanding success of Alcoholics
Anonymous may well be attributable in part to its religious character.
Two recent studies sought to isolate the effects of religion by
controlling for other factors. The first examined religion and drug use, and
found that after controlling for attachment to school and family, religious
commitment was correlated with lower usage of both marijuana and hard
drugs. 65 The second study found that after controlling for attachment to
family and attitudes toward deviant acts, religious involvement reduced the
commission of serious crime by youth in high-crime neighborhoods. 66
At the same time, there are also many reasons to be skeptical about
government support of faith-based social services. First, most of the
studies noted above are flawed in one way or another, and therefore claims
for the efficacy of faith-based services lack a solid empirical base.67 The
greatest flaw in many of the studies is that they show correlation rather than
causation. It may be that the factors that make children more likely to
escape poverty, crime, drugs and joblessness also make them more likely to
attend religious services, but that does not mean that the religious services
actually cause the positive behavior. The same is true of prisoners who
attend Bible classes in prison. While the two more recent studies
introduced some controls in an attempt to isolate causation, they by no
means controlled for all possible alternative causal factors.
In addition, studies of Teen Challenge have been criticized for having
a small sample size, overrelying on self-reporting, and failing to register
dropouts accurately. 68 And Alcoholics Anonymous' high success rates are
limited to its active, long-term members. Nearly half of initial attendees
drop out after two months, and 90% leave within a year.69 An eight-year
survey conducted by the National Institute of Alcoholism and Alcohol
64. Worth, supra note 63, at 29. But see Randy Frame, God in a Box? "Charitable Choice"
Church-State Antipoverty Partnership, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Apr. 7, 1997, at 46 (citing a 70% success
rate for Teen Challenge).
65. Byron R. Johnson, A Better Kind of High: How Religious Commitment Reduces Drug Use
Among Poor Urban Teens (2000), at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/cr_12.htm.
66. Byron R. Johnson, The Role of African-American Churches in Reducing Crime Among
Black Youth (2001), available at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/crrucs200l_2.htm.
67. See Eyal Press, Lead Us Not into Temptation, AM. PROSPECT, Apr. 9. 2001, at 20, 24; Soskis,
supra note 7, at 20-23 (arguing that there is no empirical basis for the claim that faith-based social
services are more effective than non faith-based services).
68. See Press, supra note 67, at 24; Soskis, supra note 7, at 20.
69. Soskis, supra note 7, at 22.
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Abuse found no discernible difference in the effectiveness of religious
twelve-step programs and secular alternatives. 70 As John Dilulio, the first
head of the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives,
admitted shortly before taking that office, "[W]e do not really know
whether these faith-based programs ... outperform their secular
counterparts, how they compare to one another, or whether, in any case, it
is the 'faith' in 'faith-based' that mainly determines any observed
difference."71
Nonetheless, as the accounts above of the Ten Point Coalition,
Alcoholics Anonymous, and the Nation of Islam illustrate, there is strong
anecdotal evidence about the power of faith. Although no empirical
research proves that faith-based programs are better than secular programs,
certainly none proves that they are worse. And it is difficult to dismiss the
many testimonials of those who believe they have been helped through
religious intervention.
A second caveat is that the faith-based initiative may be an effort to
privatize the provision of social services, without expanding the resources
allocated to those services, and may indeed be designed to reduce those
resources.72  The fact that faith-based initiatives' biggest champions are
often those who have long advocated tax cuts for the wealthy and reduced
assistance for the poor is a serious cause for concern. It is possible that
shifting caregiving to faith-based providers might diminish our collective
sense of responsibility as a political community for those in need.
Relatedly, for many of its supporters, the faith-based initiative reflects the
view that social problems are caused by individual moral failure rather than
structural inequities. Religious entities' emphasis on "charity" sometimes
reflects the same shortsightedness about the structural and systemic roots of
personal problems. 73 At a minimum, we must ask whether the faith-based
initiative substitutes charity for justice.
70. Id. at 23.
71. Dilulio, supra note 24, at 110.
72. See, e.g., Wendy Kaminer, Unholy Alliance, AM. PROSPECT, Nov. 1, 1997, at 54 ("Faith-
based social service programs ... are giant steps toward privatization."); Press, supra note 67, at 25
(arguing that faith-based initiative is part of the privatization movement and an effort by "the party that
has spent the past few decades dismantling the social safety net to reclaim the mantle of compassion on
the cheap").
73. See, e.g., Cathy J. Cohen, The Church?, BOSTON REV. Apr./May 2001, at 11, 12 (criticizing
churches for focusing on charity rather than empowering the poor or fighting structural problems);
Press, supra note 67, at 22 (discussing 1999 survey of 1,200 religious organizations that found that
majority of their social service activities were "'short-term, small-scale' efforts, such as sending
volunteers to help staff soup kitchens," and that congregations devoted an average of 2-4% of their
budgets to social services).
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Third, as the Nation of Islam illustrates, religion's emphasis on
community may entail intolerance for other communities. Religious
division is renowned throughout history, from the Crusades to the Spanish
Inquisition. Groups like the Nation of Islam and fundamentalist Christians
too often unite their adherents by demonizing outsiders. While religion's
independence may be a source of its strength, it is also a potential danger.
Thus, Jean-Jacques Rousseau argued that religion threatens a democratic
society because it gives people two legislative orders, two rulers, two
homelands, and potentially two contradictory obligations. 74
Fourth, despite their professed belief in the equal dignity of all human
beings, many religions remain deeply patriarchal and homophobic.
Empowering such institutions, particularly when they may be serving
women and gays and lesbians, raises serious concerns. These concerns are
illustrated by existing "charitable choice provisions," which allow religious
organizations to receive federal funding and to retain their immunity from
antidiscrimination statutes that prohibit discrimination on the basis of
religion.75
Finally, government support of religion may paradoxically undermine
some of the qualities that make religious services an attractive investment
in the first place. Religion's commitment to charitable work, for example,
might be eroded if religious institutions come to expect government
funding. The normative and legitimating authority that religion can
provide because of its independence from the state may be threatened if
religion becomes too closely aligned with the state through government
funding. The Nation of Islam brought to you by the White House Office of
Faith-Based and Community Initiatives would not be the same Nation of
Islam, for better or worse. And to the extent that public funding brings
74. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, 179, 181 (Maurice Cranston trans.,
Penguin Books 1968) (1727).
75. See 42 U.S.C. § 604a(f) (Supp. Il 1997). See also Willis, supra note 9, at 16 (criticizing the
patriarchal character of much organized religion); J. Phillip Thompson, Whose Betrayal?, BOSTON REV.
Apr./May 2001, at 13, 14 (noting organized religion's dominance by men and its homophobia).
Religious entities enjoy a general exemption from Title VII claims based on religious discrimination, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a), but the question whether they should retain that exemption when spending federal
funds is beyond the scope of this Article. For an excellent discussion of the constitutional issues
presented by extending the exemption in the government-funded setting, see Memorandum from
Randolph D. Moss, Assistant Attomey General, Office of Legal Counsel, U. S. Department of Justice,
to William P. Marshall, Deputy Counsel to the President (Oct. 12, 2000) (on file with author). The
existing Title VH exemption does not permit discrimination based on gender or race, but only on the
basis of religion, and in the absence of funding, it has been held to constitute a permissible
accommodation of religion. See Corp. of Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
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with it restrictions on religious activity, the funding may rob faith-based
programs of their most effective tool.
While the potential costs associated with funding religious social
services are considerable, so are the potential benefits. But even if one
concludes, as I do, that on policy grounds support of faith-based initiatives
is worth the risk, one must confront the constitutional question to which I
will now turn: Is government funding of faith-based social services
constitutional?
II. AN ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CONUNDRUM AND ITS
SOLUTION
"Nothing in our previous cases prevents Congress from recognizing
the important part that religion or religious organizations may play in
resolving certain secular problems."7 6 So proclaimed the Supreme Court in
Bowen v. Kendrick, upholding a law that permitted religious entities to
apply on equal terms with secular entities for government funding to
provide counseling on premarital adolescent sexual relations.77 But at the
same time, the Court insisted that the Establishment Clause bars the
government from "funding a specifically religious activity in an otherwise
substantially secular setting,"78  and prohibits "government-
financed... indoctrination into the beliefs of a particular religious faith."7 9
In other words, the Constitution allows the government to recognize the
secular benefits of religious social services, but prohibits the government
from funding precisely what the government may see as most beneficial
about them. Bowen suggests that government may fund religious entities,
but not religious activities.
In this section, I suggest that an expressivist understanding of the
Establishment Clause offers the best way of approaching the constitutional
questions presented. I first maintain that neither the separationist nor the
assimilationist approach adequately resolves the conundrum of government
support for religion. Separationism is neither possible nor desirable in the
modern world of widespread government support, while the
assimilationist's formal neutrality misses the special concerns presented by
relations between religion and the state. I then propose an expressivist
76. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 607 (1988).
77. Id. at 593.
78. Id. at 613 (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973)).
79. Id. at 611 (quoting Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 385 (1985)).
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analysis, built upon Justice O'Connor's endorsement test, as an alternative
mediating principle.
A. THE CONUNDRUM OF GOVERNMENT SUPPORT OF RELIGION
The ambivalence reflected in the quotes from Bowen above is
nowhere more evident than in the Court's convoluted decisions regarding
public aid to parochial schools, the paradigmatic faith-based social service
providers. Religious schools unquestionably perform a valuable secular
service, educating hundreds of thousands of citizens each year at little cost
to the government, and contributing to the foundations of a pluralist
democracy by nourishing a range of independent normative communities.
At the same time, religious activity and indoctrination are often integral
parts of the parochial school curriculum, particularly at the primary and
secondary levels, and therefore, public aid to parochial schools would seem
to contravene the Establishment Clause's ban on "government-
financed ... indoctrination into the beliefs of a religious faith."80 More
than fifty years ago, in its first case addressing government aid to religious
schools, the Court stated that the object of the Establishment Clause was
"to create a complete and permanent separation of the spheres of religious
activity and civil authority by comprehensively forbidding every form of
public aid or support for religion."81 Yet in that very case, the Court
upheld government assistance to parochial schools in the form of bus
transportation, prompting Justice Jackson in dissent to compare the
majority to Byron's Julia, who whispering, "I will ne'er consent,"
consented.82 The school aid cases are notoriously contradictory, as the
Court has permitted aid to parochial schools in the form of textbooks,
83
audiovisual equipment,84 and remedial teachers,85 but has ruled that the
government may not support the construction costs of buildings that might
someday be used for religious services,86 or pay parochial school teachers
to teach secular subjects or to administer essay exams. 87
The Court's ambivalence is understandable. While the Establishment
Clause appears to have been directed in significant part at banning public
80. Id.
81. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1947) (emphasis added).
82. Id. at 19 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
83. Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 238-39 (1968).
84. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 834 n.17 (2000).
85. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
86. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 674-75 (1971).
87. Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 380-81 (1985); Levitt v. Comm. for Public
Educ., 413 U.S. 472, 482 (1973).
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aid to religion, 88 a ban on all such aid, when similarly situated secular
entities receive substantial government support, seems neither fair nor
necessary to achieve the goals of the Establishment Clause. Indeed, it
arguably would penalize religion to deny it benefits otherwise generally
available.89  Accordingly, religious institutions routinely receive
governmental assistance also enjoyed by the rest of society. It is not
controversial that religions, along with all other nonprofit groups, receive
substantial tax subsidies, both directly, through nonprofit tax exemptions,
and indirectly, through charitable deductions taken by their donors.90 And
few object to the fact that churches, mosques, and synagogues receive
general government services, such as police and fire protection, garbage
collection, and mail delivery.91
Once one accepts that the baseline of broad government support
justifies some assistance to religion on equal terms with similarly situated
secular entities, it becomes difficult to articulate why any aid that is truly
evenhanded as between religion and nonreligion is problematic.
Separationists contend that public aid to religion raises at least three
problems: it may violate freedom of conscience by compelling citizens to
support religion through their tax dollars, it may co-opt religion, and it may
create religious division over access to government resources. 92 But none
of these rationales is fully satisfactory. The freedom of conscience claim
fails because we do not recognize a religious person's right to object to her
tax dollars paying for military procurement or secular public education,
even though these expenditures might equally offend her deepest
convictions. Democracy would grind to a halt if the minority could opt out
of supporting any majority-supported programs to which the minority
deeply objects. Similarly, while religious conflict over government
resources is always a potential danger, the mandate of evenhandedness, if
88. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 843 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that there are "special
Establishment Clause dangers where the government makes direct money payments to sectarian
institutions"); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 13, 63-74 (noting that Thomas Jefferson considered
"that to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he
disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical" and reprinting James Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance
warning against any tax to support religion).
89. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18 ("State power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions, than
it is to favor them.").
90. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (upholding tax exemptions for religious
institutions). Cf Marci Hamilton, Free? Exercise, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 823, 858-66 (2001)
(exploring the myriad tax exemptions that religious organizations receive).
91. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 875 (Souter, J., dissenting) (articulating separationist position, but
noting that providing religion with the same "universal general service[s]" that are available to all does
not violate bar on aid to religion).
92. See, e.g., Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 870-72 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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strictly enforced, ought to be responsive to that concern. Moreover, the
refusal to support religious institutions mandated by separationists might
itself be divisive.
93
The concern about co-opting religious autonomy is more substantial.
Government money may come with explicit and implicit strings attached,
and the lure of the funds may tempt religious institutions to alter their
practices. 94  The Establishment Clause is, after all, as much about
protecting religion from government as it is about protecting government
from religion. But Stephen Monsma's comprehensive survey of religious
institutions that receive government assistance found that very few reported
experiencing pressure to curtail their religious practices. 95  Monsma
concluded that "religious nonprofits receiving public funds [were]
relatively free to pursue religiously based practices without governmental
interference." 96  In addition, depriving religious institutions of support
offered to their secular counterparts may itself undermine their autonomy.
It is not clear why autonomy must come at the cost of equality.
Assimilationists accordingly conclude that the Establishment Clause is
satisfied as long as the government acts with a secular purpose and is
formally neutral. On this view, so long as the funding program is neutral, it
is permissible to fund religious activity and pervasively sectarian
institutions. Neutral funding does not constitute favoritism toward or
establishment of religion, but equal treatment. Indeed, many
assimilationists view the current constitutional regime, in which religious
entities are sometimes barred from receiving the same support as their
secular counterparts, as violative of the Establishment Clause, because it
favors and establishes nonreligion.
97
Although its proponents are unwilling to admit it, this view of the
Establishment Clause is the mirror image of the modern Free Exercise
Clause approach set forth in Employment Division v. Smith.98 There, the
Court held that a neutral law of general applicability does not trigger Free
Exercise Clause review simply because it has a disparate effect on
93. See Smith, supra note 11, at 304-05.
94. See GLENN, supra note 8, at 89; Pat Robertson, Mr. Bush's Faith-Based Initiative Is Flawed,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 2001, at A22 (arguing that the initiative could undermine the effectiveness of
religious programs).
95. MONSMA, supra note 4, at 81-99.
96. Id. at 98.
97. Michael W. McConnell, Equal Treatment and Religious Discrimination, in EQUAL
TREATMENT, supra note 4, at 30-54 (arguing that Supreme Court doctrine limiting public aid to
religion discriminates against religion).
98. 494 U.S. 872, 877-79 (1990).
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adherents of a particular religion.99  Under Smith, free exercise
jurisprudence requires only formal neutrality, and is uninterested in effects,
except to the extent that they reveal an improper purpose. The formal
neutrality approach to the Establishment Clause also parallels the Court's
treatment of the Equal Protection Clause, which the Court interprets to
prohibit only intentional discrimination, rendering disparate effects
irrelevant except as evidence of illicit intent.100
The assimilationists' formal neutrality approach is relatively simple to
apply, but like the formal approaches that govern Free Exercise and Equal
Protection doctrine, it may achieve ease of administration by ignoring the
lion's share of the problem. Where a formally neutral program has the
foreseeable effect of supporting almost exclusively religious entities, for
example, as in government funding of private schools, the vast majority of
which are parochial, formal neutrality does not adequately identify the
threat to Establishment Clause values. 1 1 Even if one were to conclude at
the end of the day that such funding were constitutionally permissible, it
would not be a sufficient justification that the program is formally neutral.
Given the Establishment Clause's concern about the special dangers of
intermingling religion and the state, some consideration of effects is
warranted. In the funding context, in other words, formal neutrality may be
necessary, but ought not be sufficient, to satisfy constitutional concerns.
The Court has undoubtedly moved toward the assimilationist position
in recent years. It has interpreted the Constitution not only to permit but to
require the government to support an explicitly proselytizing religious
magazine, 10 2 to display on government property a private religious
symbol, 10 3 and to afford religious groups access to school property after
school hours, 10 4 in each case because the government had permitted other
private speakers to use government resources to express secular
messages. 105 And the Court has overruled several earlier decisions barring
99. Id. at 877-79.
100. E.g., McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292-93 (1987); Pers. Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S.
256, 272-73 (1979); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 224, 238-44 (1976).
101. See Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945 (6th Cir. 2000) (striking down a formally
neutral voucher program that had the effect of financing almost exclusively students attending religious
schools), cert. granted, 122 S. Ct. 23 (2001).
102. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829-30 (1995).
103. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 759 (1995).
104. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 121 S. Ct. 2093 (2001); Lamb's Chapel v. Cent.
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 393-95 (1993).
105. Good News Club, 121 S. Ct. at 2100-02; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829-30; Pinette, 515 U.S.
at 759; Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 393-95.
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certain forms of aid to parochial schools-specifically, educational
materials and remedial educational services.10 6
But while the Court increasingly has tolerated broader government
support of religion, the assimilationists' formal neutrality view has never
garnered a majority. It came closest to doing so in Mitchell v. Helms,10 7
where four Justices adopted that view. But the decisive opinion in
Mitchell was Justice O'Connor's concurrence, joined by Justice Breyer, in
which she expressly rejected the plurality's view that neutrality was
sufficient to satisfy the Establishment Clause. 10 8 The inability of either the
separationist or the assimilationist view to attract a majority on today's
Court constitutes a kind of de facto recognition that this issue requires
compromise.
Neither separationism nor assimilationism adequately resolves the
conundrum presented by government support of religion in modern-day
America. Separationism, strictly construed, leads to discrimination against
religion, and therefore even the most devout no-aid separationists accept
the provision of some general aid to religious institutions. 10 9 At the same
time, formal neutrality misses the fact that potential religious funding
recipients may not be truly similarly situated to potential secular recipients,
precisely because they are religious. A mediating principle is needed.
B. WHEN GOVERNMENT FUNDING BECOMES GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION:
ENDORSEMENT AS A MEDIATING PRINCIPLE
I propose an expressivist approach to the Establishment Clause as a
mediating principle. This approach builds upon Justice O'Connor's
endorsement test. It focuses on how government funding will be perceived
in the community, and asks whether a reasonable observer would interpret
the program as endorsing or disapproving religion. Where government is
reasonably perceived to have endorsed religion, Justice O'Connor has
written, it "sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full
members of the political community, and an accompanying message to
believers that they are insiders, favored members of the political
106. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 835 (2000), overruling Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349
(1975) and Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 203 (1997),
overruling Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985)).
107. Mitchell, 530 U.S, at 809-10.
108. Id. at 836-45 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
109. See, e.g., id. at 874-79 (Souter, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that general government
services may be provided to religion without contravening the Establishment Clause).
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community."" From this perspective, government programs that are
neutral as between similarly situated religious and secular institutions
should often (although not always) be upheld, because an informed
reasonable observer would not perceive equal treatment of secular and
religious entities as endorsing religion. But formal neutrality is not
sufficient to satisfy the endorsement test; one must also look to effects."'
The advantage of the endorsement test is that it avoids formalism and
pays attention to the effects of various government programs. But its
avoidance of formalism is simultaneously the endorsement test's greatest
weakness. As many have pointed out, the test provides few clear
guidelines, and appears to turn on judges' inevitably subjective assessments
of a hypothetical reasonable observer's perceptions about the cultural
significance of state practices. 112  Consider, for example, the Court's
divided vote over whether Pawtucket, Rhode Island's display of a nativity
scene along with various secular symbols of Christmas contravened the
Establishment Clause. 113  Five Justices characterized the display as
acknowledging the historical event of Christmas without any resulting
endorsement of Christianity, while the four dissenters, applying the same
test to the display, saw it as placing an imprimatur of approval on Christian
faith.14 Endorsement is ultimately a matter of interpretation, and
interpretation is an art, not a science. Because it leaves legislators and the
citizenry in doubt as to where the constitutional line is drawn, the
endorsement test may deter some forms of permissible support of religion,
110. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
111. Justice O'Connor is particularly concerned about any program that renders direct monetary
aid to religious activities. See, e.g., Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 836-45. In her view, for example, a formally
neutral program that resulted in direct government support of religious activities would send the
impermissible message that the government endorsed the religious activity and should for that reason be
invalid. Id. at 842-43. While I do not share Justice O'Connor's strict antipathy to direct funding of
religious activity, I agree that one must consider effects in assessing how government programs will be
reasonably perceived.
112. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
113. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). See also County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S.
573 (1989) (holding that a city's display of a creche violates the Establishment Clause, but that a
simultaneous display of a menorah, a Christmas tree, and a sign saluting liberty does not).
114. Similar difficulties with the endorsement test are illustrated by Capitol Square Review
& Advisory Board v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995), in which Justice O'Connor found no endorsement,
applying the endorsement test from the perspective of a well-informed "hypothetical observer who is
presumed to possess a certain level of information that all citizens might not share," id. at 780
(O'Connor, J., concurring), while Justice Stevens dissented, finding endorsement when the government
conduct was viewed from the perspective of a reasonable but less omniscient passerby. Id. at 779-801
& n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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will subject other government initiatives to costly litigation, and generates
inconsistent results.11 5
Still, the endorsement inquiry asks the right question: Does the
government's conduct express a message approving or condemning
religion? This is the proper inquiry in part because, as Kenneth Karst and
Ira Lupu have observed, Establishment Clause concerns are most acutely
presented in modern America by official religious messages."16 Karst and
Lupu both argue that government religious messages are more problematic
than government funding of religion.117 As Karst puts it:
Today the risk of religious polarization does seem to have lessened in the
resource-allocation context, where the issues can be seen as part of the
everyday grist of the political mill .... Issues concerning governmental
deployments of the symbols of religion, however, have a greater capacity
to polarize .... [One reason is that] they are not the subject of
multilateral negotiation and they do not invite compromise .... 118
Lupu concurs, although he maintains that in the early days of the
Republic, the opposite was true: government messages invoking religion
were commonplace and not thought to raise significant Establishment
Clause concerns, in large part because the political/religious culture was
relatively homogenous (read Protestant). 19  Government funding of
religion was considered more problematic because of the concern that it
would lead to factional disputes among competing Protestant sects.
Lupu argues that as religious and cultural diversity have increased and
as government funding of a wide array of private activities has expanded,
Establishment Clause concerns have flipped. Today, Lupu maintains,
funding religion is less problematic, as long as it is done neutrally, because
government funding has become an accepted baseline, the support can be
spread widely, and government funds can be parceled out to religious and
secular entities evenhandedly. At the same time, government messages
incorporating religion have become more problematic, because it is now
not possible (if indeed it ever was) for a message to encompass and respect
all of the diverse religions that coexist in the United States. These features,
Lupu argues, explain the Supreme Court's increasing tolerance of
government funding of religious institutions, and its continuing strict
scrutiny of situations in which the government might be seen as expressing
115. See McConnell, supra note 97, at 38-48.
116. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
118. KARST, supra note 15, at 149.
119. Lupu, supra note 15, at 775-79.
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a religious message.12° The Court's consistent rejection of public school
prayer is a testament to its concern about official religious messages.' 2 1
Karst and Lupu are correct to point to the particular dangers posed by
official religious speech. But the distinction that they draw between
government message and government funding is not as clearcut as they
imply. As free speech doctrine has long recognized, conduct can be
expressive. 122 This is true of both private and public conduct. Government
funding therefore can express a government message. When funding
expresses a message that approves or condemns religion, it should fall
within the Establishment Clause's prohibition on official religious speech.
In the funding area, therefore, the expressivist approach asks what the
government funding program expresses vis-A-vis religion to a reasonable
observer, and invalidates those programs that express approval or
disapproval of religion.' 23
III. DEFINING ENDORSEMENT
If the endorsement test asks the right question from an expressivist
understanding of the Establishment Clause, the challenge is to identify
principles that help provide more determinate answers. The tension
120. Id. at 807-15 (comparing Court's rejection of student prayer at football game in Santa Fe
Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000), to its acceptance of government funding of
religious education in Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000)).
121. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist, 530 U.S. 290 (holding student-initiated prayer before
football games is unconstitutional); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (holding prayer at school
graduation is unconstitutional); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (holding moment of silence for
"meditation, or voluntary prayer" is unconstitutional); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (holding
posting of Ten Commandments on walls of public school classrooms is unconstitutional); Sch. Dist. of
Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (holding Bible reading or reciting the Lord's Prayer in
public schools is unconstitutional).
122. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (protecting flag burning as expressive
conduct).
123. In an excellent article, William Marshall has advocated a similar "symbolic" approach to
establishment issues, also drawing upon Justice O'Connor's endorsement test. Marshall, supra note 16,
at 498. Marshall argues, as do I, that an approach focused on the symbolic meaning of government
actions vis-A-vis religion rather than on their substantive effects provides a more coherent foundation
for establishment jurisprudence. However, I offer a different set of principles for rendering the
expressivist inquiry less indeterminate. Marshall proposes the adoption of three different
"perspectives" for different categories of issues-a separationist view for public school prayer, an
accommodationist view for government regulations, and a "qualified neutrality" view for aid to
parochial education. Id. at 541-49. The particular subject of this Article-government funding of
faith-based social services-would presumably fall within Marshall's third category, but Marshall's
"qualified neutrality" perspective does not offer much guidance as to how to resolve these issues except
to acknowledge that they are difficult. Thus, in some ways this Article takes up where Marshall leaves
off.
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identified above precludes bright lines and simple answers, but further
guidance is both desirable and possible. I propose three inquiries for
assessing the constitutionality of government aid to religion.
A. GOVERNMENT SPEECH VERSUS PRIVATE SPEECH
The first inquiry, drawn from free speech doctrine, asks whether the
aid program is itself a form of government speech. Where the government
funds individuals or organizations to express an official message, it should
be barred from funding religious activity altogether. Where, by contrast,
the government funds private speech, it may, and in some cases, must
support religious activity. Thus, the distinction between private speech and
government speech demarcates a critical first line between permissible and
impermissible public aid to religion.
In a string of cases, the Court has upheld the provision of government
benefits to religious entities for religious activities, notwithstanding the
general notion that direct aid to religious activity violates the Establishment
Clause. In Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of
Virginia,124 the Court found that the Establishment Clause permitted direct
payment of the printing costs of a religious student group's proselytizing
magazine. In Capital Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette,125 the
Court held that a city could provide space on its public property to a private
organization, the Ku Klux Klan, to display a religious cross. In Good News
Club v. Milford Central School 2 6 and Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches
Union Free School District,127 the Court ruled that the Establishment
Clause permitted the government to allow religious groups to use school
meeting rooms for explicitly religious activities after school. And in
Widmar v. Vincent,12 8 the Court held that a state university could support a
religious student group by allowing it to conduct worship services in
university meeting rooms without contravening the religion clauses.
In each case, the Court took pains to distinguish the particular
government assistance at issue from direct monetary aid. Thus, in
Rosenberger, the Court stressed that the aid was not given directly to the
student group, but instead to the printing press to pay the group's printing
costs, and that the student group, while religious in character, was not a
124. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
125. 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
126. 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
127. 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
128. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
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religious institution as such. 12 9 But as the dissent properly pointed out,
these distinctions are formalistic and unpersuasive.' 30  Ultimately,
government funds paid for the production of an explicitly religious
magazine. Similarly, in the school access cases, the Court emphasized that
no direct monetary aid had been provided. 13' But property use is a valuable
benefit; without the free use of the spaces, the groups would have to spend
money on rent. The provision of access to scarce property resources cannot
meaningfully be distinguished from direct aid.
More importantly, the form of the aid in these cases would not have
saved the programs from Establishment Clause challenges had the aid not
been neutrally distributed. If the University of Virginia paid the printing
costs for religious student magazines only, for example, the Establishment
Clause would plainly be violated, even though the aid would still not, in the
Court's view, be "direct monetary aid." The principle that unites and
explains these cases is not that the government actors formally avoided
providing direct aid, but rather that they all involved evenhanded
government support of private speech in public forums. In that context, the
First Amendment's free speech guarantee compels evenhandedness. Thus,
not only could the state support religious speakers; it was constitutionally
required to do so. In Widmar and Rosenberger, the Court held that state
universities that broadly supported private student organizations' speech
had created a public forum and could not deny similar support to religious
private student organizations. 3 2 In Pinette, the Court applied the same free
speech analysis to grant the Ku Klux Klan access to a public forum for the
display of a cross. 13 3 And in Good News Club and Lamb's Chapel, the
Court required public schools that had opened their classrooms after hours
to non-religious community groups to permit access to religious groups on
equal terms. 134 The constitutional mandate of neutrality, founded on the
Free Speech Clause, was in turn critical to the Establishment Clause
inquiry, because it meant that the government support of religious practices
was attributable to private initiative (and constitutional compulsion), and
not to a political judgment by the government itself. The Free Speech
Clause required the government to remain neutral, and the Establishment
129. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 843-44.
130. Id. at 886-89 (Souter, J., dissenting).
131. See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395 (characterizing benefit to religion as "no more than
incidental"); Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274 (characterizing benefit to religion as "incidental," not direct).
132. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829-31; Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267-69.
133. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 763 (2000).




Clause was not violated when private speakers used that neutral support for
religious ends.
But the government is not always required to remain neutral when it
funds speech. Where the government contracts with private speakers to
express its own message, the government may discriminate on the basis of
both content and viewpoint. Thus, a state "Say No to Drugs" campaign
may commission artists to create posters, and may insist that those posters
express an anti-drug message. From a free speech perspective, government
speech need not be neutral. 135
The distinction between government speech and private speech proved
critical in Rosenberger. There, the University of Virginia, relying on Rust
v. Sullivan,136 argued that because it was simply declining to fund student
speech, rather than prohibiting speech altogether, it "must have substantial
discretion in determining how to allocate scarce resources to accomplish its
educational mission."'137 In Rust, the Court had rejected a free speech
challenge to regulations requiring government-funded family planning
centers to counsel pregnant women about childbirth but not abortion,
reasoning that the government had a relatively free hand in allocating its
funds for speech purposes. The Rosenberger Court explained that the
leeway accorded the government in Rust does not apply to all government
funding of speech, but only to "government speech," that is, only where the
government is hiring others to express an official message.'38 In that
setting, government control of content and viewpoint is necessary; the
government cannot effectively counsel women to avoid abortions unless it
can require its recipients to use its money to express that particular
message. Where, by contrast, the state does not seek to express an official
message, but rather to support a wide range of private expression, as in
Rosenberger, the state is governed by much more stringent speech
standards, and must maintain viewpoint neutrality. 139
The distinction between government speech and private speech is also
critical to the Establishment Clause inquiry, although here it works in the
opposite direction. Under the Free Speech Clause, the government is
135. See David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality in
Government-Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 675, 702-04 (1992).
136. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
137. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 832.
138. Id. at 833-34.
139. Id. at 834. I have criticized the Rust decision on the ground that certain spheres of expression
demand neutrality even when they are funded by the government, but that critique is limited to
particular spheres, and acknowledges that government must be permitted to deviate from neutrality in
many government speech settings. See Cole, supra note 135, at 702-04.
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relatively unconstrained by the Constitution with respect to government
speech, but bound to strict neutrality when it supports a broad range of
private speech. Under the Establishment Clause, by contrast, the
government has more leeway to support religion, constitutionally speaking,
when it is simultaneously supporting a broad range of private speech than
when it engages in government speech. Where, as in the public forum
cases discussed above, the government supports a multiplicity of private
voices, its neutral support of religious voices among the many does not
contravene the Establishment Clause. As long as the government remains
neutral in its support, as required by the Free Speech Clause, the
government does not endorse or impermissibly advance religion, because
any support of religion that results is by definition privately initiated; the
government exercises no content control. Where, by contrast, the
government funds an entity to express the government's message, as in
Rust v. Sullivan, it must avoid support of religious messages, because the
government itself would then be engaged in the official advancement of
religion.140  Thus, the Rosenberger Court noted that the student activity
funding program "respects the critical difference 'between government
speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and
private speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise
Clauses protect."'' 1
41
The government speech-private speech distinction also explains the
apparent tension between Bowen v. Kendrick142 and the public forum cases
described above. In Bowen, the Court rejected a facial challenge to the
Adolescent Family Life Act (AFLA), which authorized federal grants to
nonprofit institutions, including religious institutions, for counseling on
premarital adolescent sexual relations. The Court held that the statute was
valid on its face because it neutrally supported religious and secular
140. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 577-78 (1992) (holding that the Establishment
Clause prohibits prayer at public school commencement ceremony, in part because public school
dictates content of prayer); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam) (holding that the
Establishment Clause invalidates state law requiring the posting of Ten Commandments in public
school classrooms). See also Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unity of Separation and Neutrality, 46
EMORY L.J. 43, 72 (1997) (noting "government speech.., can neither praise religion nor condemn it").
141. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 841 (emphasis in original) (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496
U.S. 226, 250 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring)). The plurality opinion in Pinette quoted the same
passage. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 765-66 (1995). See also
Sullivan, supra note 11, at 244 (arguing that Rosenberger and Pinette suggest that public support of
parochial schools is unconstitutional because public education is government speech, and therefore may
not be religious in content).
142. 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
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institutions, reasoning that "[r]eligious institutions need not be quarantined
from public benefits that are neutrally available to all." 143
At the same time, however, the Court suggested that if plaintiffs could
show that federal funds under AFLA actually supported any religious
activity, or any "pervasively sectarian institutions (in which secular and
religious activity are by definition inextricably intertwined), the
Establishment Clause would be violated." 144 At first glance, Bowen seems
difficult to reconcile with Rosenberger, Widmar, and the like, where the
Court held that government support of religious activities did not violate
the Establishment Clause. But there is a critical difference: the Bowen
program, like the Title X program in Rust v. Sullivan, was a government
speech program. The government was funding institutions to counsel
youth about premarital sex, and it had a particular message to express; it
was not creating a public forum to promote private speech irrespective of
its message. In that setting, the Court held, the government may fund
neither religious activity nor "pervasively sectarian institutions," even
where the program as a whole has a secular purpose and is neutrally
administered. 145 When Title X or AFLA counselors speak, they speak for
the government. If a counselor expressing the government's message does
so through religious proselytization, it is akin to the government
proselytizing, a paradigmatic violation of the Establishment Clause.
By contrast, when a private student group speaking for itself
proselytizes, it is the student group that is expressing a religious message,
not the government. If the only government support the student group
143. id. at 608 (quoting Roemer v. Md. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 746 (1976)).
144. The majority opinion is admittedly less than entirely clear on this point. It states that the
Establishment Clause bars "funding a specifically religious activity in an otherwise substantially secular
setting." Id. at 613 (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973)). It also prohibits
"government-financed ... indoctrination into the beliefs of a particular religious faith." Id. at 611
(quoting School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 385 (1985)). Those passages suggest that
any funding of religious activity or a pervasively sectarian institution would be prohibited. But in
another passage, the Court implies that some funding of "pervasively sectarian" institutions might be
permissible when it notes that there is no evidence that a "significant proportion of the federal funds
will be disbursed to 'pervasively sectarian' institutions." Id. at 610 (emphasis added). The Court was
probably ambiguous because it was addressing a facial challenge. The fact that some aid is going to
pervasively sectarian institutions may not justify facial invalidation of a statute, even if those particular
instances of aid might constitute "as applied" violations of the Establishment Clause. Thus, when the
majority discusses the nature of the "as applied" challenge to be addressed on remand, it suggests that
any funding of a pervasively sectarian institution would be permissible. Id. at 621. Justices Kennedy
and Scalia write separately to state their view, apparently not shared by the majority, that a showing that
aid goes to pervasively sectarian institution "will not alone be enough, in an as-applied challenge, to
make out a violation of the Establishment Clause." Id. at 624 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
145. Id. at621.
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receives is pursuant to a program that is designed and required to provide
support to similarly situated speakers on a viewpoint-neutral basis,
government support cannot be attributed to government favoritism toward
religion just because the religious viewpoint is espoused with government
support. Under Rosenberger, Wide Awake magazine was entitled to
receive government support to engage in religious indoctrination, yet the
support did not violate the Establishment Clause because the source of the
indoctrination was the students, not the government, and the government
was not involved in regulating the content of the magazine's message in
any way. The government's neutral support, required by the Free Speech
Clause, expressed no message favoring or disfavoring religion.
Where a program expresses an official message-such as "say no to
drugs"-the government is speaking, albeit through a hired voice. When
the government funds a drug treatment counseling program, therefore, it is
engaged in government speech. Such programs must discourage drug use.
If an applicant for funding sought to encourage drug use, the government
would properly deny funding. If the applicant then sued on free speech
grounds, its suit would be dismissed on the ground that when the
government hires people to express its own message, it is free to
discriminate on the basis of content and viewpoint. But by the same token,
if a group engages in religious instruction or practice as an integral part of
its drug treatment, as Teen Challenge does, the government cannot support
it without violating the Establishment Clause. Because the government
dictates-albeit in broad outlines-the drug treatment's message, the
government would be inextricably intertwined with the religious message.
Just as the government must avoid any religious content in its own speech,
it must avoid supporting any religious content in programs it funds to
express a government message.
In theory, one might distinguish between the message the government
dictates-for example, "say no to drugs"-and the method by which that
message is communicated. Thus, one might argue that even in a drug
treatment program the government may be neutral as between religious and
secular methods of expressing its message, so that if some recipients
choose to use religious activity to express the message, that choice is a
matter of private initiative not attributable to the government. I do not
believe one can parse government speech so finely, however. In a very real
sense, medium and message are linked. If the message is officially
sanctioned, a reasonable observer seeing it expressed with government
funding through religious activity would perceive the government as
endorsing the religious method of communication. While in theory one
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might disentangle the religious and state-sanctioned strands of the speech,
such parsing is unlikely in practice, and does not sufficiently ameliorate the
establishment concerns presented by joint religious-state expression. Thus,
in my view, once a program is deemed to be government speech, no
religious activity is permissible.
It will not always be easy to characterize a program as involving
government speech. One might argue, for example, that a drug treatment
program does not express a message, but treats a medical condition. The
condition can be treated medically as well as through counseling. But
when drug addiction is treated through counseling, at least part of the
message is plainly mandated by the purpose of the program-"say no to
drugs." And when that message is communicated through express religious
practice and religious invocations, as is the case in Teen Challenge, the
Establishment Clause problem is manifest. Thus, if a free speech challenge
would fail on the ground that the program constitutes government speech,
an Establishment Clause challenge should prevail if the program supports
religious activity.
Where government funding is designed to express an official message,
then, funding a religious activity to express that message raises the same
concerns that explicit government religious messages raise. Although
Karst and Lupu are correct that government messages raise Establishment
Clause concerns more sharply than does aid to religion, the distinction
disappears where aid programs are government speech programs; in those
situations, government aid to religion is equivalent to an official religious
message.
B. STRUCTURAL ENDORSEMENT
The taxonomy of government funding programs is not exhausted by
government speech programs on the one hand and programs that support a
broad range of private expression on the other. Many government funding
programs do not support speech at all. Programs that fund youth sports
leagues or soup kitchens, for example, involve neither government speech
nor private speech. For Establishment Clause purposes, then, there are at
least three types of programs in which faith-based entities might potentially
receive government funding: government speech programs; public forum
programs; and nonspeech programs. Only in the first category is funding
of religious activity per se prohibited. In the other settings, government
funding of religious activity should generally be permissible as long as the
program's structure does not express approval or disapproval of religion.
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The distinction between speech and nonspeech programs helps to
explain the intuition, noted by both Justices O'Connor and Blackmun in
Bowen, that government funding of a soup kitchen operated by a church
poses fewer concerns than government funding of sexual counseling
provided by a church. 146 The soup kitchen is less problematic not simply
because it is easier to avoid religious indoctrination in that setting, but
because if the entity were to engage in religious indoctrination, the
indoctrination would be privately initiated, not government sanctioned. In
subsidizing a soup kitchen, the government generally does not dictate
anything about message. If a soup ladler wants to talk politics, sports,
weather, or religion, she is free to do so, and the government should not be
seen as endorsing the ladler's views.
Government funding can express a message endorsing religion,
however, even when it is not funding government speech as such. If the
structure of the program itself endorses or disapproves of religion the
Establishment Clause will be violated. A program's structure can endorse
religion in a variety of ways. Perhaps the most straightforward example
would be a program that explicitly favors religious recipients. A
government funding program that favored faith-based soup kitchens would
be reasonably perceived as endorsing religion, even if no speech were
involved in the program itself. If the program were to favor soup kitchens
of a particular religious denomination, the violation would be even more
manifest. Accordingly, an expressivist understanding of the Establishment
Clause requires courts to ask not only whether the program funds
government speech, but also whether the structure of the program itself
expresses an impermissible message vis-h-vis religion that renders
nonadherents or adherents outsiders.
This does not mean, however, that any funding program that funds
religious entities because they are religious is invalid for that reason. By
its very nature, President Bush's faith-based initiative seeks to support
certain institutions and services because they are faith-based. Proponents
of the initiative, however, maintain that religious providers in the past have
been unfairly and unnecessarily excluded from the government-funded
social services circuit, and that the initiative merely seeks to place religious
146. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 623 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Using religious organizations to
advance the secular goals of the AFLA, without thereby permitting religious indoctrination, is
inevitably more difficult than in other projects, such as ministering to the poor and the sick."); id. at 641
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("There is a very real and important difference between running a soup




institutions on an equal playing field with secular providers. 47 To assess
whether the initiative improperly endorses religion, therefore, would
require examination of the structure and effects of the initiative as it is
implemented. If it is implemented in a scrupulously neutral manner as
between religious and secular service providers, the mere fact that the
initiative stems from a desire to fund entities because they are religious
should not be fatal. The message of the initiative would not be to endorse
religion as an end in itself, but to ensure that religious and secular entities
were treated equally, a permissible goal.
The examples of programs expressly favoring religious providers
illustrate the necessity of both a secular purpose and the application of
neutral criteria in choosing among religious and secular providers. But
formal neutrality in this sense is not sufficient, even in the non-
government-speech context. Imagine a government program that used
neutral criteria to contract with independent entities to provide basic
housing and subsistence to the poor, but which, despite its neutral criteria,
funded almost exclusively religious providers that included some measure
of religious activity in their provision of services. This might happen if
religious providers were the predominant applicants for funding, or if the
religious providers were, on neutral terms, better qualified to provide the
services in question. Such a program would presumably satisfy the
assimilationists because it would have a secular purpose, the provision of
food and shelter, and would be governed by neutral selection criteria.
From an expressivist perspective, however, such a program would
raise a distinct Establishment Clause problem. Citizens who did not share
the providers' religious faith would effectively be required to engage in
religious activity in order to receive government support. Such a scheme
would not be coercive in the strictest sense, because in theory one could
avoid the religious activity by forgoing the government benefit. But it
would place an unconstitutional condition on a government benefit because
it would imply that adherence to religion is relevant to one's political
standing in the community: those comfortable with engaging in religious
activity are eligible for government support, but those who object are not.
Thus, to avoid an Establishment Clause problem, any government
contracting scheme for providing social services to citizens must not only
have a secular purpose and be allocated according to neutral criteria, but
also must ensure that there are alternative secular providers of comparable
147. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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quality available for any citizen who objects to receiving services in a
religious setting. 148
A more difficult question is whether a formally neutral program that in
effect overwhelmingly benefited religious recipients might reasonably be
perceived as endorsing religion, even where secular alternatives are
available to all who seek them. Thus, it is for now an open question
whether a school voucher program in a community where virtually all the
private schools were religious might be invalid for endorsing religion, even
though every child would retain the option of attending a secular public
school. 149
Requiring something like "proportionate funding" of religious
providers, however, raises potentially insurmountable difficulties. First,
while a reasonable observer might consider a program that predominantly
supported religious providers to have endorsed religion, a fully informed
observer who understood that this was simply the result of applying a truly
neutral set of criteria might not perceive any endorsement, particularly if
the state has provided comparable secular alternatives. Moreover,
application of an "effects test" would require the courts to assess what
constitutes "disproportionate funding of religious providers"-an inquiry
that, if answerable at all, would itself be deeply divisive. Indeed, its very
resolution by a court might well lead adherents or nonadherents to consider
themselves outsiders, no matter how it were decided. In addition, a
requirement of "proportional funding of secular and religious providers"
would in practice require government to violate the mandate of neutrality in
some settings, because in order to avoid disproportionate results, it would
need to deviate from neutral criteria. For example, when religious
providers are better qualified according to neutral criteria, a departure from
neutrality would be required to achieve proportionate results. Given the
potential morass of problems posed by requiring proportionate funding, the
148. Existing charitable choice provisions recognize this obligation and guarantee that all
objecting citizens will have access to secular providers. 42 U.S.C. § 604a(e)(1). Some have suggested
that this requirement will necessarily lead to an expansion in government-funded social services, as the
effort to expand funding of religious providers will trigger a correlative need for expanded secular
alternatives as well. Marcia Yablon, Growth Spurt, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 26, 2001, at 18.
Some differences in quality between programs are inevitable, of course, but substantial
differences would render the requirement that a secular provider be available a mere formality. On this
view, for example, a voucher program for education that funded excellent parochial schools would not
be saved by the mere existence of a public school option if that option were not substantially similar in
quality to the state-subsidized parochial schools.
149. The question is likely to be resolved in the Supreme Court's review of Simmons-Harris v.
Zelman, 234 F.3d 945 (6th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 122 S. Ct. 23 (2001), addressing the
constitutionality of a voucher program in Cleveland, Ohio.
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prophylactic requirement that secular providers be made available for any
objecting citizen may be a better mechanism for ensuring a reasonable mix
of funding recipients.
In non-government-speech settings, in other words, support of express
religious activity should be permissible as long as the government has a
secular purpose, distributes its funds evenhandedly without regard to an
entity's religious identity or activities, and ensures that comparable secular
service providers are available for all who desire them. If the government
is permitted (and indeed required) to support religious activity when it
neutrally supports all speech in the public forum context, it should be
permitted to support religious activity in nonspeech programs wherever it is
scrupulously neutral, maintains no control over the content of speech
within the funded program, and provides sufficient secular alternatives.
C. DIRECT AID VERSUS INDIRECT AID
The third line of inquiry important to an expressivist model of the
Establishment Clause focuses on whether funding is direct or indirect. The
Court has repeatedly found direct aid to religion much more problematic
than indirect aid. Outside the public forum cases, the Court has virtually
always held that direct aid to religious activity is unconstitutional. But
where the government allocates money to private individuals, and the
private individuals make independent decisions to spend it on religious
activity, the government does not establish religion as long as it has not
done anything to encourage private individuals to make religious
expenditures; here, formal neutrality is generally sufficient. The classic
example of permissible indirect aid is the tax deduction for charitable
donations. The deduction amounts to a substantial and foreseeable subsidy
to religious institutions (and other nonprofit groups), and there is no
constitutional limitation on its use for religious activities. But nothing
about the nature of the deduction, which is available to all for a wide range
of charitable donations, encourages people to donate to religious as
opposed to secular nonprofit organizations. Accordingly, the deduction
does not present Establishment Clause concerns, even though it results in
substantial government subsidies to religious activity. 150
150. See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 388-89 (1983) (upholding income tax deduction
for educational expenses, no matter where those expenses are incurred); Walz v. Tax Comm., 397 U.S.
664 (1970) (upholding property tax exemption for real or personal property used exclusively for
religious, educational, or charitable purposes).
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The same analysis explains cases that have upheld government aid to
individuals that the individual recipients have then spent on religious
education. In Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind,
the Court upheld a statute that subsidized vocational rehabilitation services
for the visually handicapped, as applied to a blind student who used
government funds to pay tuition at a Christian college for pastoral
training.' 51 And in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District, the Court
upheld a state program that paid the salary of a sign language interpreter for
a deaf student to attend parochial school, even though the interpreter would
be interpreting, among other things, religious services.' 52 Critical to the
Court's analysis in both cases was the fact that the government did not
direct the funding to the religious schools, but extended benefits to eligible
private citizens, without regard to religion, who then independently chose
to spend the resources in religious settings. Such situations, the Court
reasoned, are little different from paying public employees' salaries with
government funds, which the employees are then free to spend on religious
and secular organizations and activities alike. 153 When the state directs
money to an individual with no attempt to influence where he or she spends
it, and the individual remains free to make her own private choices with the
money she receives, the government has not chosen to support religion. As
the Court stated in Zobrest, because the statute "creates no financial
incentive for parents to choose a sectarian school, an interpreter's presence
there cannot be attributed to state decisionmaking."1 54  In expressivist
terms, a system of broad governmental support directed to private citizens
generally will not be reasonably perceived as endorsing religion so long as
private citizens independently decide to direct that support to religion. The
indirect structure of the aid helps to ensure that its expressive character is
neutral as between religious and secular uses.
The distinction between direct and indirect aid is not purely
formalistic. The Court will not sanction indirect aid where it is a
"transparent fiction" for directing aid to religious entities.1 55 Some cases
are undoubtedly easier than others. Where the government merely pays its
employees' salaries, it truly plays no role in deciding where they will spend
their income. But in most programs of indirect aid, the government is not
so agnostic. In social service settings, the government generally does not
151. 474 U.S. 481, 483,489 (1986).
152. 509 U.S. 1, 1-2 (1993).
153. Witters, 474 U.S. at 486-87.
154. Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 10.
155. Witters, 474 U.S. at 487 n.4.
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hand out cash that can be spent for anything, but vouchers or
reimbursement agreements that can be redeemed only for specified
purposes with approved providers. The government must often determine
where and for what purposes the vouchers can be redeemed, and to that
extent cannot avoid the business of approving or disapproving
expenditures. If, for example, the government were to establish a voucher
program for homeless shelters, it would likely specify the programs in
which the vouchers could be redeemed, to ensure that its money was spent
on adequate shelters. The government would then have to decide whether a
religiously based shelter that incorporates religious practices is eligible to
redeem government vouchers. Unless it is guided by wholly secular
criteria and shows no favoritism toward particular religions or faith-based
providers generally, that decision might well be seen as endorsing or
establishing religion. In such a setting, even if the government is not
dictating where each individual voucher will be spent, it is deciding where
vouchers generally may go, and the latter decision could present
Establishment Clause problems if it expresses approval or disapproval of
religion. Thus, the more selective voucher programs are in specifying
eligible redeeming institutions, the more likely they are to appear to
endorse religion where religious entities are approved providers.
While the indirect character of aid will generally reduce the likelihood
that a government program will be seen as endorsing religion, aid need not
be indirect to withstand constitutional scrutiny. As noted above, even
direct aid to religious activity is permissible where government speech is
not involved, so long as it is pursuant to a general aid program that utilizes
neutral criteria that neither favor nor disfavor religion, and ensures
adequate secular alternatives. Where aid is structured indirectly, however,
it may be easier to establish that the program is neutral vis-A-vis religion.
To summarize, the Constitution permits government to provide
funding to religion for secular purposes as long as in doing so it does not
express approval or disapproval of religion. Where government provides
aid to private citizens and allows them to choose whether to spend it for
religious or secular activities, it generally should not be seen as expressing
approval or disapproval of religion, and therefore the government program
should pass muster under the Establishment Clause. The significance of
the structure of the aid is that, like the free-speech mandate in the public
forum setting, it ensures that any resulting religious activity will be
attributable to private rather than governmental decisionmaking. In the
indirect aid setting, however, the criteria by which the government decides
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what institutions are eligible to redeem vouchers or apply for
reimbursement must themselves be scrupulously secular.
Perhaps the most difficult question posed by the faith-based initiative
is whether a system of indirect funding, such as a voucher program, would
permit the support of religious activity even in an otherwise impermissible
government speech setting. One can imagine a drug treatment counseling
program in which addicts obtain certificates at a central government office,
redeemable at any of a wide range of sectarian and secular drug treatment
programs. It is plausible, on the strength of cases like Witters and Zobrest,
that even if the program as a whole constitutes government speech, the
recipient's intervening private choice to redeem the certificate at a religious
drug treatment center would effectively insulate the government from an
Establishment Clause challenge. In such a situation, one might argue, the
religious practice would be the result of private initiative, not government
encouragement or direction.
But a drug treatment voucher program is different from the
government benefits upheld in Witters and Zobrest. In Witters and Zobrest,
the government made no attempt to control the content of expression
supported by its grant. Students were free to use the services at any
educational institution. By contrast, a drug treatment program has a very
specific message to express. Were an addict to seek to use the certificate at
a medical marijuana center that sought to encourage and normalize drug
use, for example, the certificate presumably would not be redeemable.
Thus, the government must approve of the treatment provided by the
recipient institution, and if that treatment has an express religious
component, it must endorse, in some respect, the religious method of
expressing its "say no to drugs" message. The question is a close one, but
in such a setting, indirect funding probably ought not insulate the program
from an Establishment Clause challenge.156
156. Kathleen Sullivan has argued that a similar analysis invalidates school voucher programs that
support parochial schools. See Sullivan, supra note 11, at 258. But while Sullivan is correct that public
education is government speech, it is not so clear that parochial school education becomes government
speech merely because it receives some government support. Depending on how it is structured, a
school voucher program might be more closely analogous to a limited public forum in which the state
supports a wide range of diverse private expression and does not seek to dictate content. If government
sought to dictate the content of education wherever its funds were used, then the program might well
constitute government speech and preclude support of religious activity, but it is not clear that all




Government support of religion presents a fundamental paradox. On
the one hand, religion would find it difficult if not impossible to survive in
modern America without access to the government subsidies generally
available to nonprofit entities; strict separation of church and state is
neither fair nor possible in modern-day America. And it seems likely, as de
Tocqueville and George Washington famously noted, that the health of our
democratic system depends at least in some measure on religion and the
values it fosters. On the other hand, religion's vitality depends in large
measure on its independence, and institutionalized state support threatens
that independence. What is needed is an intermediate position between
separation and assimilation, in which religion maintains its independence
but is neither driven from the public square nor disadvantaged by its
religious character.
My own essay illustrates this tension. Although I contend that there
are strong policy arguments in favor of government support for faith-based
interventions, I also find that much of that support presents substantial
constitutional concerns. The expressivist understanding of the
Establishment Clause proposed here seeks to acknowledge the reality and
significance of the tension and to avoid the extremes of both separationism
and assimilationism. I suggest that Justice O'Connor's endorsement test be
conceived as an attempt to identify when government practices express
approval or disapproval of religion, building on the insights of Karst and
Lupu that official messages present more acute establishment problems
than does government funding.
Under an expressivist approach to the Establishment Clause,
government aid to religious activity should be permissible in three settings.
First, such aid is permissible where it results from programs neutrally
supporting private speech in a public forum setting. Second, aid is
generally valid where the government directs resources to private citizens
and allows them free choice as to where to spend them. And third, direct
aid to religious activity should be allowed where the government neutrally
supports nonspeech programs for secular purposes, without regard to their
religious character, and ensures that comparable secular alternatives are
available for all who seek access to government services from nonreligious
providers. In each of these settings, financial support of religious activity
should not be understood to express approval of religion because any
religious activity that results will be attributable to private initiative.
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By contrast, when the funded program is designed to express a
particular message, it constitutes government speech, which may not be
religious, no matter how the funding is structured. Here, a reasonable
observer would perceive the government to be endorsing religion by
funding entities to spread an official message by religious means. Thus, an
absolute ban on funding religious activity is justified where government
speech is involved.
So understood, the Establishment Clause disables government from
supporting faith-based interventions in many settings where a distinctly
religious voice may be most useful-where religious messages reinforce
governmental messages. Entities through which the government seeks to
express a particular message may not receive direct government support if
the message is expressed through religious activities. And I conclude that
even indirect funding of such programs would offend the Establishment
Clause because it would require government approval of a religious method
for expressing the government's message. This is not a trivial constraint.
Most rehabilitation programs, for example, seek to express a particular
message, namely that the offender should forgo a life of crime and pursue a
law-abiding life. As we have seen, that message might be particularly
effective coming from a religious institution that has independent and
untainted normative authority, that is structured to address those who break
the rules with understanding and compassion, that has an established
community support structure, and that can appeal to a higher sense of moral
duty and obligation. But the government is disabled from supporting the
delivery of such a message.
At the same time, the constitutional rules I advocate here may help to
reinforce and preserve the power of religion. In their study of the Ten
Point Coalition's success in Boston, Jenny Berrien, Omar McRoberts, and
Christopher Winship observed:
By providing an umbrella of legitimacy for police work, the ministers
help legitimize the whole system. But this also makes their own
legitimacy more precarious. If the ministers are too supportive of the
police then they are vulnerable to being accused of selling out .... It is
critical that their relationship with the police be seen as being at arm's
length. 15
7
My approach recognizes that religious activity can and should receive
government support in some settings, but at the same time insists on an
arms' length relationship that strictly respects religious independence
157. Berrien et al., supra note 24, at 280.
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where the government speaks. If religious interventions derive their power
in some fundamental way from their independence from the state, these
rules may help to preserve faith's force for good in our society.
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